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The strategic timing and adverse events hypotheses of personal bankruptcy 
have received particular attention. Existing research focuses on proving or 
disproving either hypothesis, using a strict interpretation of the role of 
financial benefit in the filing decision. Using a more realistic framework in 
which financial benefit may affect the filing decision in both hypotheses, we 
show that endogeneity of financial benefit is a distinguishing factor between 
the two hypotheses. Using two different datasets, we show that the 
endogeneity test favors the adverse events hypothesis. Extending the 
analysis to allow for both types, we find evidence of heterogeneity in filing 
types, consistent with both hypotheses. On average, approximately 16 
percent of households are more likely to behave as strategic types and 84 
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1. Introduction 
Personal bankruptcy rates have increased at an annual rate of 3.9 percent since 1990, from about 
718 thousand (non-business) bankruptcies in 1990 to about 1.5 million in 2010. There has been 
widespread debate about the causes of this increase and policy responses to this phenomenon. 
Partly as a response to this increase, the Congress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, the largest overhaul of bankruptcy laws since 1980. This led 
to a spike in bankruptcies in 2005 (about 2 million non-business bankruptcies) just before the 
law took effect in 2006 (about 600 thousand non-business bankruptcies). Since 2006, 
bankruptcies have continued to rise steadily once more, reaching a level of about 1.5 million in 
2010.  
Although the literature on bankruptcy has grown,
2 some basic questions have not yet been 
settled, such as whether consumers behave strategically, and if so, how widespread is this 
phenomenon. Understanding the motivations of consumers to file for bankruptcy is central to the 
design of appropriate policies to manage the number of filings.  
The study of consumer bankruptcy has highlighted several reasons why a consumer files for 
bankruptcy. Two hypotheses, adverse events hypothesis and strategic timing hypothesis, have 
received particular attention. This paper tried to understand and reconcile these hypotheses.  
The adverse events hypothesis postulates that consumers file for bankruptcy mainly because they 
experience adverse events, and financial stresses associated with such events. Adverse events 
occur, for example, in the form of a job loss, medical problems, and particular family issues such 
as divorce. Financial stresses associated with such events arise, for example, in the form of 
income interruption, income reduction, or debt increase.  
                                                            
2 The literature on consumer bankruptcy is very large. A partial list includes the following. Girth (1971) presents 
early work in this area. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1989, 1994, and 2000) present a version of the adverse 
events theory. White (1987, 1998), Domowitz and Sartain (1999), Gross and Souleles (2002), Fay, Hurst, and White 
(2002), Fan and White (2003), Han and Li (2004), Livshits, Macgee, and Tertilt (2007, 2008) explore versions of 
adverse events and strategic timing theories and their impact on micro and macro decisions. Ausubel (1991, 1997) 
explores aspects of competition in the credit card industry. Theoretical models for default and bankruptcy with 
competitive and incomplete markets are considered in Zame (1993), Modica, Rustichini, and Tallon (1999), Araujo 
and Pascoa (2002), Sabarwal (2003), Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005), Geanakoplos and Zame (2007), and 
Hoelle (2009), among others.  Page | 3  
 
The strategic timing hypothesis postulates that a rational consumer incorporates in her decision-
making, the bankruptcy option available under law, and its associated costs and benefits, makes 
the best use of her economic environment, and chooses an optimal time to file for bankruptcy. In 
particular, if the best choice includes a strategic, and lawful, use of debt and the bankruptcy 
system, then that is reflected in consumer choice.  
At the heart of each hypothesis is the role of financial benefit in the bankruptcy filing decision.  
In the “strict” interpretation, strategic timing hypothesis holds, if, ceteris paribus, filing benefit 
affects the bankruptcy decision positively, and adverse events hypothesis holds, if, ceteris 
paribus, adverse events variables affect a consumer’s decision to file. Using data from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Fay, Hurst, and White (2002), (henceforth, FHW,) show that 
financial benefit is positively and significantly related to the filing decision, and after controlling 
for financial benefit, adverse events variables do not affect the bankruptcy decision (except for a 
marginally significant positive effect of divorce). Using Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 
data, we document a similar effect of financial benefit, but a strongly significant and positive 
effect of divorce. Thus, using the strict interpretation, the PSID dataset provides some support 
for the strategic hypothesis while the SCF dataset provides some support for both the strategic 
and the adverse events hypothesis. 
The strict interpretation implicitly assumes that strategic behavior is the only behavior affecting 
financial benefit.  
More realistically, financial benefit from filing goes up when a consumer strategically increases 
unsecured debt before filing, consistent with strategic behavior; and it also goes up when she 
uses unsecured debt (e.g. a credit card) to pay for expenses due to adverse events, consistent with 
adverse events behavior. Therefore, financial benefit is affected by both types of behaviors, and a 
positive coefficient on financial benefit alone may not be sufficient to distinguish between the 
two hypotheses. This point may be made more generally; we show that in the standard random 
utility model underlying the binary choice of filing and not filing, the coefficient on unsecured 
debt (and hence, on financial benefit from filing) is positive, regardless of how debt is 
accumulated.  Page | 4  
 
In this paper, we propose that even when financial benefit may affect the filing decision in either 
hypothesis, the inclusion of financial benefit as an optimizing variable is a testable difference 
between the two hypotheses. In other words, strategic consumers may additionally manipulate 
debt before filing, but adverse events consumers do not. We formalize this distinction by 
inquiring whether financial benefit is exogenous or endogenous to the filing decision.
4 The 
discussions provide a set of natural instrumental variables, the adverse events. Using both PSID 
data and SCF data, we show that financial benefit is exogenous to the bankruptcy decision, 
consistent with adverse events hypothesis. With both datasets, the coefficient on financial benefit 
from filing is strongly significantly positive.  
To inquire into the possibility of both types of behavior existing simultaneously, we extend the 
analysis by estimating a model with two unobserved types. We find evidence of heterogeneity in 
types consistent with both behaviors. In particular, financial benefit is shown to be endogenous 
for the strategic type, and exogenous for the adverse events type. The coefficient on financial 
benefit is significantly positive for the strategic type and positive but insignificant for the adverse 
events type. These results show a role for both hypotheses.  
Moreover, most of the variables for adverse events have the same effect on financial benefit for 
both types, but with a larger absolute effect for strategic types. Not working lowers financial 
benefit, increasing unemployment spell increases financial benefit, and divorce increases 
financial benefit. Health problems present a mixed picture, a positive (and marginally 
significant) effect on financial benefit for adverse types, but decreasing (and insignificant) effect 
for strategic types.  These results document a financial-benefits channel for adverse events. 
As the types are unobserved, a mixture-density type of model is used. The exclusion restriction 
includes access to debt markets (in terms of the number of credit cards), income, a measure of 
risk aversion, and a measure of financial savviness. Henry, Kitamura, and Salanie (2010) provide 
conditions for the non-parametric identification of mixture-density models. Both Henry, 
Kitamura and Salanie (2010) and Gan, Huang, and Mayer (2011) suggest a Hausman-type 
                                                            
4 FHW do not explore potential endogeneity of financial benefit. Page | 5  
 
specification test. We find supporting evidence of the current two-type model when applying the 
test.  
We find that lower access to debt markets and lower income significantly increase the chance of 
strategic behavior. There is little evidence, however, of the effect of risk aversion and financial 
savviness. On average, about 16 percent of the sample is strategic type, and 84 percent is adverse 
events type, providing support for the exogeneity of financial benefit in the one-type model.  
For comparisons between the two types, the population is divided into two groups. A household 
is of strategic type, if its type probability is greater than 0.5, and is of adverse events type 
otherwise. We find that as compared to adverse events types, strategic types have higher 
probability of filing and higher (log) financial benefit from filing, consistent with the theoretical 
framework.  
The estimated model is used to predict effects of hypothesized changes in key variables. In 
particular, we document the effects on filing probabilities resulting from the effect of adverse 
events on financial benefits; exhibiting a financial-benefits channel for adverse events effects.  
As bankruptcy is a form of insurance, the ideas here may be related to moral hazard in insurance 
markets, as follows. Moral hazard relates to increasing the benefit from insurance by taking some 
(additional) actions that increase insurance payoffs. In our version, strategic timing behavior is 
similar to moral hazard, in the sense that these consumers may additionally increase unsecured 
debt before filing to increase their financial benefit from filing. Adverse events consumers do not 
exhibit such moral hazard. Thus, another way to formulate a distinction between the two 
hypotheses is to inquire whether, and to what extent, moral hazard is present in the bankruptcy 
decision.  
The question of adverse selection is not as relevant here; in principle, everyone under the U.S. 
legal jurisdiction has access to bankruptcy, without having to pay something to be selected into 
having a bankruptcy option.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical models and testable predictions, 
and section 3 presents the econometric specifications, data, and results.  Page | 6  
 
 
2 Theoretical Models and Predictions 
First, we show a positive relationship between unsecured debt and probability of filing for 
bankruptcy, regardless of how debt is accumulated. Next, we formulate simple models of adverse 
events and strategic timing hypotheses, and highlight their different predictions.  
2.1 A Positive Correlation between Financial Benefit and Filing Probability 
FHW indicate that a positive and significant relationship between household financial benefit 
and probability of filing for bankruptcy signals strategic behavior by a consumer. Similarly, 
Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009) suggest that an increase in probability of default with loan size 
is consistent with either moral hazard behavior or adverse selection behavior. In the same spirit, 
we present a simple model showing that financial benefit may affect the probability of filing, 
regardless of how debt is accumulated.  
In most empirical work, filing for bankruptcy is modeled as a binary choice model. According to 
McFadden’s Random Utility Maximization model, a person would file for bankruptcy if his 
utility difference between filing and not filing is positive. To investigate this difference, let d be 
unsecured debt and w be assets minus secured debt. For simplicity, the exemptions are 
normalized to be zero. Financial benefit from filing, given d, is    0 , max , w d d file fb   , and 
financial benefit from not filing, given d, is      0 , max , d w d Not fb   .  Notice that 
   d Not fb d file fb , ,   if and only if d ≥ w.  
Let u denote utility from monetary outcomes. Assume that u is strictly increasing and 
continuously differentiable. We may write utility from filing, given d as: 
  d file fb u d file U , ,  ; utility from not filing, given d as     d Not fb u d Not U , ,  ; and the 
difference in these utilities is       d Not U d file U d U , ,    . Therefore,  
              d Not fb d Not fb u d file fb d file fb u d U , ' , ' , ' , ' '    .  
Consider the following cases.  Page | 7  
 
d > w: In this case,   1 , '  d file fb  and   0 , '  d Not fb . Therefore,      0 , ' '    d Not fb u d U .  
d < w: In this case,   0 , '  d file fb  and    1 , '   d Not fb , whence,      0 , ' '    d Not fb u d U .  
d = w: In this case,          0 0 ' , ' , ' lim   
 u w file fb u d file fb u
w d , and similarly, 
       0 0 ' , ' , ' lim   
 u w Not fb u d Not fb u
w d .  
In all cases, we have  0 '   d U .   
In terms of empirical prediction, this implies that the coefficient on unsecured debt (and 
consequently, on financial benefit from filing) is positive, regardless of how debt is 
accumulated.
5 Therefore, given unsecured debt d, a positive relationship between financial 
benefit from filing and filing for bankruptcy is expected.  
2.2 Adverse Events Hypothesis  
Frequent support for adverse events hypothesis has been advanced by Sullivan, Warren, and 
Westbrook (1989, 1994, 2000), among others. Using data from bankruptcy filings in 1981 (for 
Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Texas), and in 1991 (for Illinois, Pennsylvania, Texas, California, and 
Tennessee), these authors paint a rich portrait of consumers in bankruptcy, they present statistics 
that indicate similarities between  bankrupt debtors and the general population, especially 
middle-class families, and they present a variety of cases and statistics to conclude that while 
some cases of abuse of bankruptcy law may exist, bankruptcy is predominantly due to adverse 
events. As they put it succinctly,
6 “No one plans to go bankrupt.”  
In terms of formulating a model for this hypothesis, it is useful to keep in mind that a pattern that 
emerges consistently in this hypothesis is that there are some events for which consumers do not 
plan (even if they may, in principle, be aware of the existence of such events), and if such an 
event occurs, then they may be compelled to file for bankruptcy. If such an event does not occur, 
                                                            
5 Notice that all we used here was that u is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable. No additional 
restriction is imposed on utility. 
6 Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000), page 73.  Page | 8  
 
consumers do not consider filing for bankruptcy. For a statement like this to be true in a model of 
this hypothesis, it is important to answer at least two questions. First, why don't consumers plan 
for some events? Second, even if they don't plan for some events, why do they not include a 
bankruptcy option in the events for which they do plan?  
Consumers might not plan for some events if they assign an event a subjective probability of 
zero. For example, we observe that in surveys of individual mortality, some consumers list as 
zero their probability of next-period mortality (Gan, Hurd, and McFadden, 2005). Such an 
assignment can arise if the cost of making very fine probability distinctions is relatively high, or 
it can arise as a mistake that has a miniscule impact. For example, in the PSID data, the 
probability of bankruptcy is 0.003017, as reported in FHW.  
It is somewhat harder to justify theoretically why, in events for which consumers otherwise plan, 
they do not include a bankruptcy option that is legally, and in principle, widely available. One 
explanation for this is that ex ante, the benefit from a bankruptcy filing is low relative to costs; 
for example, as reported in FHW, for families that can gain from a bankruptcy filing, the mean 
benefit from filing is $7,813, and the probability of filing is 0.003017, for an ex-ante filing 
benefit of about $25. This is less than the cost of a planning session with a bankruptcy lawyer, or 
the resources expended to purchase and plan with a book on how-to-file. Another explanation 
can be provided in terms of utility penalties arising from future reputation losses from filing; for 
example, see Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005). Such losses can arise from a combination 
of restricted future access to debt markets, credit score impact (for severity of credit score 
impact, see Musto 2004,) and loss of option to re-file for some period (six years for a Chapter 7 
filing). If such losses are very high when consumers file in the absence of adverse events, and 
such losses outweigh benefits of filing, then in non-adverse events, consumers may optimally 
decide not to consider a bankruptcy option. For example, a bankruptcy flag on a consumer credit 
report is one of the worst derogatories on a credit report, and it stays there for ten years, but the 
legal system allows a Chapter 7 re-filing after six years. Consequently, the longer memory of 
financial institutions of a consumer bankruptcy filing increases the cost of filing by increasing 
future costs of accessing debt markets.  Page | 9  
 
Therefore, as a first approximation, we may view adverse events consumers as taking decisions 
sequentially; in period 1, they plan for some events, and in such events, they do not plan to file 
for bankruptcy, but they do not plan for other events (termed adverse events). In period 2, if a 
planned-for event occurs, they consume as planned, and if an adverse event occurs, they include 
a bankruptcy option in their decision-making and re-optimize accordingly. In other words, in 
period 1, “adverse events consumers do not plan to go bankrupt.”  
Consider a standard, two-period decision-making framework. In the first period, there is one 
decision node. In the second period, one of three states of the world prevails; a good state, 
indexed g, a bad state, b, and a terrible state, t, thought of as an adverse events state. Each state 
corresponds to a decision node, and the probability of each state is πg, πb, and πt, respectively, 
with πg + πb + πt = 1.  
As usual, a consumer has to decide how much to consume at each node; his consumption is 
indexed c0, cg, cb, and ct. Moreover, lending markets are available to him at a one-period, risk-
adjusted, market interest rate r. As usual, a single consumer takes interest rates as given. His 
endowment in consumption units at each node is denoted w0, wg, wb, and wt. (For convenience, 
suppose w0 = 0, and 0 < wt < wb < wg.) Moreover, he has to decide how much debt to take, 
subject to some exogenously specified debt limit; indexed 0  d . His twice continuously 
differentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility is denoted  ) (c u  with 
. ) ( lim , ) ( lim , 0 , 0 0              c u c u u u c c  His expected utility is 
)]. ( ) ( ) ( [ ) ( 0 t t b b g g c u c u c u c u U           
An adverse events consumer takes decisions sequentially. In period 1, he plans for states g, b, 
and he plans to remain solvent in these states, but he does not plan for state t, the adverse events 
state. In period 2, if g or b occurs, he consumes as planned, but if t occurs, he considers the 
option to file for bankruptcy. There are some costs of filing for bankruptcy; usually some loss of 
assets, court fees, lawyer fees, limited future participation in debt markets, and so on. Benefits of 
filing include, among others, discharge of debt, fresh start, and accompanying wealth insurance. 
Adapting a simple form of a Chapter 7 filing,
7 it is assumed that a filer gives up all his assets 
                                                            
7 Historically, Chapter 7 bankruptcies account for about 70 percent of all bankruptcies.  Page | 10  
 
except any exemptions from forfeiture provided by law, and his debt is discharged.
8 Exemptions 
specified under law are summarized by e. Consequently, an adverse events consumer solves the 
following problem.  
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In Stage I, a consumer decides optimal debt and consumption (d, c0, cg, cb), and by assumption, 
he does not file in g, b. Given d > 0, and wt < e, in Stage II, if t occurs, optimal choice is to file 
and consume ct = wt.  
2.3 Strategic Timing Hypothesis  
A strategic timing consumer is a standard fully rational consumer who includes the bankruptcy 
option in her maximization problem. Assumptions regarding decision nodes, endowments, utility 
functions, and expected utility are the same as in the previous case. Moreover, it is assumed that 
the bankruptcy process is the same as in the previous case. Of course, the difference is in the 
optimization problem. In each state in the second period, a strategic timing consumer has an 
option to file for bankruptcy, and solves the following problem.  
 
                                                            
8 The other main personal bankruptcy category, Chapter 13 bankruptcy, accounting for about 29 percent of all cases, 
can be viewed in this formulation as follows. In this type of filing, a repayment plan proposed by the debtor is 
confirmed by the Court, and a discharge of remaining debt is provided on successful completion of the plan. In this 
case, net assets saved and debts discharged depend on the repayment plan, and can be mapped to this model after an 
appropriate discounting for period of plan. Exemptions provided under law are the same in both cases.  Page | 11  
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The maximum operator for decision nodes in the second period corresponds to the bankruptcy 
decision. For example, if a consumer decides not to file in g, her constraint is wg - (1+r)d, and if 
she decides to file, her constraint is min(w , e), where, as before, e captures exemptions permitted 
in bankruptcy.   
2.4 Comparisons between the Hypotheses and Empirical Predictions 
One distinction between strategic timing and adverse events hypothesis is that for strategic 
timing consumers, the bankruptcy decision and the debt decision (and consequently, financial 
benefit) are jointly determined, whereas for adverse events consumers, the debt decision (and 
consequently, financial benefit) is exogenous to the filing decision. This follows immediately 
from the construction of the two models.  
For the clearest distinctions between the two hypotheses in terms of financial benefits and 
probabilities of filing, suppose  . 0 g b t w e w w      That is, exemptions are sufficiently high to 
have non-negative financial benefit from filing in bad and terrible states, but not necessarily in a 
good state.
9  
In this case, strategic timing consumers file for bankruptcy in states t and b, and perhaps in g as 
well, whereas adverse events consumers file only in state t. Therefore, a second distinction is that 
adverse events consumers may file less frequently (or equivalently, with lower probability) than 
strategic timing consumers. 
Another intuitive comparative statics result that can be seen here formally is that debt use by 
adverse events consumers is sometimes less, and never more than that for strategic timing 
                                                            
9 Appendix A presents details on utility maximizing solutions in this case.  Page | 12  
 
consumers. Of course, when debt limits are sufficiently low, both types might decide to use 
maximum possible debt, and in this case, debt levels are the same. But notice that the optimal 
debt level for adverse events consumers can be lower than that for strategic timing consumers, 
because for every d,  
   
  
  d MU d u
d MU d r w u r d u




b b g g
AE
, file ) ( '
, not ) 1 ( ' ) 1 ( ) ( '
) 1 ( ' ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ' ) 1 ( ) ( ' ) (
 
     
        
 
   
 
Here, MU
ST(not, d) is the marginal utility to the strategic consumer from not filing in state g 
when debt is d, and MU
ST(file, d) is the marginal utility to the strategic consumer from filing in 
state g when debt is d. Therefore, if not filing in g is optimal for the strategic consumer, then 
     
AE AE ST ST ST AE d MU d MU d MU
* * * 0 , not    , whence d
*AE < d
*ST. (Here, d
*AE is the 
optimal debt level for the adverse events consumer, d
*ST  for the strategic consumer, and we used 
the easy-to-check fact that  0 / ) (    d d MU
AE .) Similarly, if filing in g is optimal for the 
strategic consumer, then       
AE AE ST ST ST AE d MU d MU d MU
* * * 0 , file    , and again, d
*AE < 
d
*ST. Consequently, unsecured debt (and therefore, financial benefit from filing) is larger for 
strategic consumers than for adverse events consumers.  
In summary, the empirical predictions from the theoretical analysis include: (a) financial benefit 
is endogenous to the bankruptcy decision in the strategic timing hypothesis and exogenous in the 
adverse events hypothesis; and (b) financial benefit and probability of filing for bankruptcy are 
higher in strategic timing hypothesis than in adverse events hypothesis. 
2.5 Some Limitations 
The models presented above are simple models, and by no means capture all relevant aspects of 
the bankruptcy decision. Issues related to choosing a particular period to file for bankruptcy, or 
to repeat interactions with credit markets, or to choice of bankruptcy chapter, or to role of legal 
advertising, or to effects on supply of credit, or to effects on work incentives, and so on are not 
considered here. (Some of these are the subject of other papers, listed above.) It is possible to 
consider some of these issues here in a reduced form by including parameters for expected gains Page | 13  
 
and losses from delaying a decision, or reduced access to credit markets, or utility penalties for 
default, and then focusing on parameter values which make particular versions of the models 
more likely to occur, but it is unclear if such additions would yield tractable models, or have 
additional applications given the paucity of available data.  
The results here can be viewed as providing an indication of alternative hypotheses being borne 
out in the data, rather than a definitive conclusion in favor of one hypothesis or the other. For 
example, in addition to research supporting different hypotheses, the reported surge in 
bankruptcy filings before the deadline of October 17, 2005 for the new bankruptcy law to go into 
effect suggests that other factors (perhaps informational spillovers emerging from declining 
social stigma, or lawyer advertising) are important as well. No doubt, additional work may yield 
additional testable predictions, and additional research would be very welcome.  
 
3   Econometric Models and Results  
In this section, we first provide some information on the data and construction of variables. Next, 
we present three specifications and estimation results for each specification. The specifications 
considered are: a simple Probit model, a one-type model (with joint maximum likelihood 
estimation), and a two-type model (with joint maximum likelihood estimation).  
3.1    Data description and variables  
We use two different datasets to check robustness of our results. One is the combined cross-
section and time series sample of PSID households over the period 1984-1995; the same dataset 
is used in FHW. The other is the cross sectional dataset of SCF from 1998.  
In 1996, the PSID asked respondents whether they had ever filed for bankruptcy and if so, in 
which year. This information, combined with other household characteristics forms the basis of 
our first dataset. The PSID data are generally of high quality, but they have some limitations for 
a study of this kind. In particular, wealth is only measured at 5-year intervals, and it contains less 
detail on some aspects of use in this study. Moreover, as documented in FHW, there are only 254 
bankruptcy filings over the period 1984-1995,  and bankruptcy filings in the PSID are only about Page | 14  
 
one-half of the national filing rate. There were 55 bankruptcy filings in 1997, or about 1.28 
percent of households, comparable to the 1997 national bankruptcy filing rate of 1.16 percent. 
The SCF is cross-sectional only, so we lose the time-series aspect in this case; but there is some 
information for the year prior to the survey, and on future expectations.   
SCF also provides us with better wealth data, which reports 1997 wealth information and 1997 
bankruptcy filings. (The survey itself was conducted between June and December of 1998.
10) In 
table 1, we compare financial benefits (discussed below) and unsecured debt between filers and 
non-filers for both PSID and SCF. Similar patterns emerge. In PSID, the mean log(financial 
benefit) for filers is more than twice as much than those non-filers. In SCF, filers have more than 
three times as much mean log(financial benefits) than non-filers. In both SCF and PSID, the 
mean log(unsecured debt) for filers is greater than that of non-filers.  
Financial benefit from filing is the key variable in this paper. It is calculated as follows:  
] 0 ), 0 , max( max[ exemption wealth debt fb     
In this formula,  ) 0 , max( exemption wealth calculates the nonexempt assets that a filer loses in 
bankruptcy. It measures financial cost of filing for bankruptcy.
11 The variable debt measures the 
unsecured debt that will be discharged in bankruptcy; a measure of benefit of filing. As not filing 
dominates filing when  ) 0 , max( exemption wealth debt   is negative, the financial benefit from 
filing is truncated at 0 to yield the above formula.  
To calculate financial benefit in the PSID, we use the same dataset as FHW.  
For the SCF, we make the following adjustments. The SCF provides only region codes; state 
codes are not released in public data. To get a relative weight for each state in a region, we use 
Regional Economic Information System (REIS) from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. These 
                                                            
10 See Kennickell et. at (1998).  
11 A more complete measure of costs would include both out-of-pocket filing costs, and future costs resulting from 
more restricted access to debt markets. Reliable data on these measures is not available. Adding a constant, of 
course, would not change the qualitative results.  Page | 15  
 
state weights are based on the population of a state relative to the region in which it is included. 
These weights are used to compute the composite exemption level of a region.  
Using Elias, Renauer, and Leonard (1999), we determine each state’s exemption levels for 1998 
for homestead equity in owner-occupied homes, equity in vehicles, personal property, and 
wildcard exemptions. We adjust for state level variables to the extent we can. For example, if a 
state doubles exemptions for married households, we do the same. For the fifteen states allowing 
residents to choose between state or federal exemptions, we take the larger of the exemptions. 
For households in states with an unlimited homestead exemption, we take the homestead 
exemption to be the average of home values in the entire sample.  
The variable exemption is assumed to be the sum of these exemptions, because we do not 
observe a household’s state of residence. The variable wealth is the sum of net worth of 
businesses a household owns, current values of the vehicles it owns, and value of real estate it 
owns.  
To make the two datasets consistent with each other, we include a vector of demographic 
variables which may be related to households’ filing decisions, such as age of household head, 
years of education of the head, family size, whether head owns their home. Moreover, as adverse 
events variables, we include spell of unemployment, its squared term, whether the head is 
unemployed, whether the head’s marital status is divorce, whether the head’s health condition is 
poor. For the PSID dataset, these variables are calculated using the values of corresponding 
variables in the year prior to their bankruptcy. For the SCF data, we include only the region 
dummies rather than macro information to capture the local fixed effects due to the lack of 
information regarding state of residency. 
3.2   Simple Probit model 
Let’s first consider a simple Probit regression, similar to FHW’s specification.  
 0 1      u AE X fb file          
This specification explores the strategic timing and adverse event hypotheses by running the 
Probit regression of whether households file for bankruptcy (file) as a function of their potential Page | 16  
 
financial benefit, fb, from filing, their personal and state characteristics X, and the adverse events 
they encountered in the previous year, AE.  
As described above, the strict interpretation focuses on the significance of the coefficients on 
financial benefit and on adverse events. If strategic timing hypothesis is true, the coefficients of 
financial benefit should be positive and significant while the adverse event variables should not 
be significant. If adverse event hypothesis is true, then adverse event variables should be positive 
and significant while the coefficient of financial benefit should be insignificant.  
Table 2 illustrates this simple specification with PSID data and SCF data.
12 (For ease of 
comparison, we keep the other variables same as those in FHW.) As shown in table 2, using 
PSID data, the coefficients on the variables are comparable to those reported in FHW. In 
particular, financial benefit affects the filing decision positively and highly significantly, and its 
squared term is highly significant. Among statistically significant adverse events, divorce is 
positive but only marginally significant. Moreover, using SCF data, financial benefit continues to 
be positive and highly significant, but its squared term is not significant any more. The 
coefficient on divorce remains positive, but is highly significant.  
Thus, using the strict interpretation, and the simple Probit model, the PSID dataset provides 
support for the strategic hypothesis while the SCF dataset provides support for both the strategic 
and the adverse events hypothesis.   
3.3 One-type model (MLE)  
Given the limitation of the strict interpretation, we propose to test the endogeneity of financial 
benefit by jointly estimating financial benefit and the bankruptcy decision. The basic empirical 
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v AE X fb                   (4) 
Notice that endogeneity of ln(fb+1) is equivalent to whether the error terms u and v are correlated.  
The key difference between this model and FHW’s specification is the role of the set of adverse 
events, AE.  Here, AE no longer directly affects a person’s bankruptcy decision. Instead, it serves 
as the set of instrumental variables that directly affects the financial benefits, fb, in (4). Another 
minor difference between these two models is that the logarithm of financial benefit is used here 
while FHW use the level of financial benefits. As fb depends on the wealth level, it is most likely 
to exhibit a log-normal distribution, although censored at zero. With a logarithm transformation, 
we will assume that v is normally distributed.   
Let Var(u) = 1, 
2 ) ( v v Var   , and assume the relationship between u and v as follows:  
         v u ,                                 
where Cov(v, ε) = 0, and 
2 2 1 ) ( v Var      .  In this version, testing if ln(fb+1) is endogenous is 
equivalent to testing if the parameter   = 0. The probability a household files when financial 
benefit is zero is given by  
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and therefore, the probability it does not file when financial benefit is zero is given by  
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The log-likelihood function over the sample is given by 
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 (5) 
Estimation results are presented in tables 3 and 4.
13 We find that using either PSID data (table 3), 
or SCF data (table 4), the estimated parameter θ is not statistically different from zero, consistent 
with the adverse events hypothesis. At the same time, log financial benefit has a positive and 
highly significant effect on the decision to file for bankruptcy in both datasets.  
Both datasets confirm the view that adverse events may affect financial benefit. In the PSID data 
(table 3), health shocks and period of unemployment increase financial benefit highly 
significantly, whereas a switch from working to not working (no work dummy) decreases 
financial benefit. In the SCF data (table 4), divorce increases financial benefit highly 
significantly, whereas no work decreases financial benefit.  In both datasets, period of 
unemployment increases financial benefit (highly significantly in the PSID data, but 
insignificantly in the SCF data), and its square term is negative.  
3.4 Two-type model (MLE)  
To inquire into the possibility of both types of behavior existing simultaneously, we extend the 
analysis to allow for heterogeneity in types by proposing a two-type model.  
Let a random variable T = 1 if a person is a strategic type, and T = 2 if a person is a non-strategic 
(or adverse events) type. For simplicity, we let  
                                                            
13 We apply a log transformation to financial benefit, because this variable exhibits a distribution that is similar to 
log-normal but is left-censored at zero. In particular, we use log(financial benefit + $1). This is to capture the 
characteristics of censored data at zero. The transformed variable is also left-censored at zero. Page | 19  
 
Pr(T = 1) = Φ(Wα), and Pr(T = 2) = 1 - Φ(Wα). 
W is a set of type-determinant variables, which will be discussed more in detail later in this 
subsection. The filing decision may be impacted differently for each type, as follows.  
When T = 1, the filing equation is    0 ) 1 ln( 1 1 1 1      u fb X file   .   (6.1) 
When T = 2, the filing equation is    0 ) 1 ln( 1 2 2 2      u fb X file   .   (6.2) 
We normalize the variances of the error terms for both types to be 1, i.e.  1 ) ( ) ( 2 1   u Var u Var .  
Similarly, we allow behavior in accumulating debt or financial benefit to be different for each 
type. For the strategic type, financial benefit is assumed to be endogenous, and for the adverse 
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where  0 ) , ( 2 2  v u Cov . In empirical estimation, we will allow the possibility that  0 ) , ( 2 2  v u Cov , 
and estimate their correlation.  
Notice that the joint density of (bank, ln(fb+1)) consists of four parts, (bank = 0,  ln(fb+1) = 0 ), 
(bank = 1,  ln(fb+1) = 0 ), (bank = 0,  ln(fb+1) ), and (bank = 1,  ln(fb+1)). In the last two cases 
ln(fb+1) is positive and continuous. The density function for each of the four cases is given in 
Appendix B.   
The model suggested here belongs to the class of the mixture density models. A well-known 
necessary identification condition of the model requires the exclusion restriction, i.e., the set W is Page | 20  
 
different from X and AE.  Henry, Kitamura, and Salanié (2010) show that a correlation between 
W and T and the independence between W and the error terms (u1 and u2) in equations (6.1) and 
(6.2) are sufficient to identify the model up to a linear transformation non-parametrically. When 
the set W has more than one variable, Henry, Kitamura, and Salanié (2010) and Gan, Huang, and 
Mayer (2011) show that a using the full set of W and a subset of W would both produce 
consistent estimates of parameters of the model except the coefficients to determine the type. A 
Hausman-type specification test can be implemented by comparing estimates using the full set of 
W with those using a subset of W.
14 This test is similar to an overidentification test in the 
instrumental variable models.  
Here we suggest a set of variables that includes number of credit cards, logarithm of income, 
whether the person is risk averse,
15 and whether the person shops around for the best term.
16. 
These variables are not in the set of X that directly explains the bankruptcy decision.   
Our prior is that a person’s credit worthiness may be an important factor in determining her type. 
A better credit-scored person may be less likely to be the strategic type. Since credit scores are 
not available in the data set, several variables that are related to credit scores are used. Therefore, 
the person with fewer numbers of cards is more likely to belong to the strategic type. Moreover, 
it is reasonable to postulate that a person who shops around is more frugal, and hence less likely 
to take on debt, and therefore, less focused on planning for bankruptcy. Thus, a person who 
shops around more may be less likely to be a strategic type. The effect of risk aversion on 
determining the type is unclear. It is not necessarily the case that a more risk-averse person is 
                                                            
14 Gan, Huang, and Mayer (2011) provide an economic interpretation of this type of mixture density model.  
15 SCF asks its respondents: “Which of the statements on this page comes closest to the amount of financial risk that 
you are willing to take when you save or make investments?” and we define the variable “risk averse” to be one if 
the respondent chooses “not willing to take any financial risks”. 
 
16SCF asks its respondents: “When making major saving and investment decisions, some people shop around for the 
very best terms while others don't. What number would you be on the scale?" And this variable is a number between 
1 and 5, the larger the number, the greater the shopping. 
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more likely to file for bankruptcy.
17  The summary statistics of these four variables can be found 
in table 1. All variables have substantial variations.  
Table 5 shows estimation results for this model, using SCF data.
18 This framework provides the 
clearest distinctions between the two models, as described in section 2 above.  
One important distinction between the two models is endogeneity or exogeneity of financial 
benefit. Although we allow for the possibility of non-zero correlation between the error terms in 
the bankruptcy model and the financial benefit model for both types, only the strategic type 
exhibits a statistically significant (at the 90 percent level) correlation, at  -0.5846 (0.3285), while 
the correlation for the adverse events type is statistically insignificant, at 0.2581 (0.4163). Thus, 
financial benefit is endogenous to the bankruptcy decision for strategic types, and exogenous for 
adverse events types, as predicted by the hypothesis.  
The coefficient on log of financial benefit is positive and highly significant for the strategic type, 
at 0.2770 (0.0570), but for adverse events type, this coefficient is positive and insignificant, at 
0.0110 (0.0858). The coefficient for the strategic type is larger than the coefficient for the 
adverse events type, as predicted by the hypothesis.  
Similarly, variables for adverse events (other than health problems) have the same effect on both 
types, but with a larger absolute effect for strategic types. Not working lowers financial benefit, 
increasing unemployment spell increases financial benefit, and divorce increases financial 
benefit. Health problems present a mixed picture, a positive (and marginally significant) effect 
on financial benefit for adverse types, but decreasing (and insignificant) effect for strategic types.  
These results document a financial-benefits channel for adverse events.  
The last panel in table 5 shows that fewer numbers of credit cards increases the chance of 
strategic behavior, as does an increase in risk aversion. Consumers who shop around more are 
less likely to be strategic type. A lower income also increases the chance of strategic behavior.  
                                                            
17 Gan and Mosquera (2008) (Appendix ) show that a more risk averse person may or may not have a higher 
probability of default, depending on relative current income and future income.  
18 The two-type model could only be estimated using SCF data, partly because PSID does not have the type-
determination variables similar to those in SCF.  Page | 22  
 
As shown in table 6, the average probability of being a strategic type is 0.1566. This provides 
additional confirmation for the exogeneity of financial benefit in the one-type model.  
For additional analysis of the two types, we divide the population into two groups. A household 
is of strategic type, if its type probability is greater than 0.5, and is of adverse events type 
otherwise. According to this criterion, 802 households are strategic type and 3,503 households 
are adverse events type, as shown in table 6.  
Notably, on average, a strategic type has a 3.37% chance to file for bankruptcy, more than 4 
times higher than the 0.8% chance of the adverse type. This greater filing probability is 
consistent with the empirical prediction of the model in section 2. Similarly, in terms of the 
predicted probabilities, a strategic type is expected to have 9.84% chance to file for bankruptcy 
while the adverse events type would have 0. 61% chance to file for bankruptcy.  
Moreover, the two types exhibit different levels of financial benefits. The average level of log of 
financial benefit is 2.4523 for the strategic type, about 34 percent larger than 1.8287 for the 
adverse events type. The larger financial benefit for strategic type is again consistent with the 
prediction of the model. Similarly, on average, about 30.8% of strategic type consumers have 
strictly positive financial benefit, as compared to 20.81% of adverse events type.  
As shown in table 6, the predicted probability of filing for bankruptcy is higher than actual for 
both types. One possible explanation is that financial benefit from filing for bankruptcy is 
heavily censored at zero (about 80 percent of the financial benefit calculations take the value of 
zero), and the predicted value is close to the true data of the percentage of those zeroes. This may 
also provide a reason why the bias of mean of log financial benefit is so large.  
Table 7 shows the effects of hypothesized changes in particular variables on the probability of 
filing.
19 For example, if financial benefit goes up by $1,000, and all other characteristics are held 
constant at sample means, the average strategic type’s filing probability goes up 0.0221 
percentage points (equivalently, the filing probability increases by 0.0221), that of an adverse 
                                                            
19 The columns for percentage point marginal effect show the change in filing probability. The column labeled 
“Total” gives the weighted average of the changes, using probability of strategic type as 0.1566 and that of adverse 
events type as 0.8434.  Page | 23  
 
events type goes up negligibly, and the total filing probability goes up about 0.0035 percentage 
points. In terms of a percentage change in the filing rate, filing rates for strategic types go up by 
65.58 percent, those for adverse types go up by 0.24 percent, and total filings go up by 27.4 
percent.
20 Similarly, if home-ownership increases by 5 percentage points, the filing rates of 
strategic types go up about 21 percent, those of adverse types go down negligibly, and the overall 
filing rate goes up about 9 percent.  
Our framework allows estimates of the effects of adverse events on filing probabilities through 
the channel of financial benefit. Table 8 presents some of these effects. If the average spell of 
unemployment goes down by 1 week, the filing rate of strategic types goes down 93 percent, that 
of adverse events goes down negligibly, and the overall filing rate goes down 38 percent. A 5 
percentage point decrease in the proportion of people not working leads to an increase in filing 
rate of strategic types by 27 percent, a negligible increase for adverse types, and an 11 percent 
increase in the overall filing rate. Similarly, a decrease of 5 percentage points in divorce, lowers 
the overall filing rate by about 8 percent. Notice that the comparatively smaller effects for 
adverse type (as compared to strategic type) are in part due to their much lower responsiveness to 
financial benefit in the bankruptcy equation.  
Finally, table 9 lists the Hausman specification test suggested in Henry, Kitamura, and Salanié 
(2010), and Gan, Huang, and Mayer (2011). As described in table 5, the full set of type 
determination variables includes ln(income), number of credit cards, an indicator for risk 
aversion, and an index variable for financial savviness (shopping around). The first column in 
table 9 presents estimates of several key variables of the model using the full set of W. The 
second column has the estimation results without the indicator for risk aversion and the 
“shopping around variable.” The test shows that different of the coefficients for all parameters 
(except type-determination variables in W) from the full set of W and from a subset of W are not 
statistically different. This result provides supporting evidence on the specification of the current 
model. Column 3, however, tells a different story. This column is estimated without the 
                                                            
20 The last three columns in table 7 translate the marginal effects into the corresponding percentage change in the 
filing rate, as follows: divide the marginal effect of the strategic type by the filing probability of strategic type, 
which is 0.0337 in the sample, that of adverse type by their filing probability, which is 0.008, and the total by the 
total filing probability, which is 0.01278. Page | 24  
 
"ln(income)" and “number of credit card” variables. The difference of coefficient estimates with 
the estimates from the full set of W is statistically significant. This contradictory testing result is 
likely due to the rather weak relationship between the unobserved type and the risk aversion 
variable and the shopping around variable (both of these two variables are statistically 
insignificant in table 5).  
4. Conclusions  
The adverse events and strategic timing hypotheses have received particular attention in the 
debate on bankruptcy. Existing work proposes to distinguish between these hypotheses in a 
“strict” manner, which does not allow adverse events to affect probability of filing through the 
channel of financial benefits.  
We propose testing for endogeneity of financial benefit as a distinguishing feature between the 
hypotheses. Financial benefit is endogenous to the filing decision for strategic types, and 
exogenous for adverse events types. This test allows adverse events to affect probability of filing 
in both hypotheses through the channel of financial benefit.  
Using a single-type model, we show that both the PSID and the SCF data support the adverse 
events hypothesis.   
Extending the analysis to allow for the more realistic case of both types existing simultaneously, 
we propose and estimate a mixture-density type model with two types. We find evidence of both 
types of behavior in the data. In particular, financial benefit is endogenous for the strategic type 
and exogenous for the adverse events type. On average, about 16 percent of the sample is 
strategic type, and 84 percent is adverse events type, providing support for the exogeneity of 
financial benefit in the one-type model. These results show a role for both hypotheses. A 
specification test  provides some supporting evidence of this two-type model.   
The estimates here are broadly consistent with theoretical predictions: the probability of filing 
and the financial benefit from filing are both larger for strategic type than for adverse events 
type. There is some evidence of a “financial-benefits” channel of the effect of adverse events on Page | 25  
 
filing probability.  We also find that marginal effect of financial benefit on filing probability is 
larger for the strategic type than for the adverse events type.  
Notably, the models here are simple, and do not capture all relevant aspects of the bankruptcy 
decision. Similarly, data limitations prevent more thorough investigation of these ideas. 
Additional research on both aspects would help understand the bankruptcy decision in more 
detail.  Page | 26  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variables  PSID data    SCF data 
 
Mean value  Standard 




Number of bankruptcy filings  254    55 
Financial benefit  $1,411  $10,523    $3,991  $26,001 
Log(financial benefit +1)  1.64  3.24    1.95  3.69 
    Those file for bankruptcy   3.65  4.26    6.78  4.38 
Log(unsecured debt+1)  3.85  3.94    4.35  4.45 
    Those file for bankruptcy  5.74  3.96    5.88  3.96 
Household labor income  $26,552  $32,672    $43,035  $37,967 
Age of household head  44.19  15.96    49.84  16.52 
Years of education of household head  12.43  5.10    13.74  2.90 
Family size  2.90  1.55    2.65  1.44 
Own home  0.59  0.49    0.70  0.46 
Self employed/own business  0.11  0.31    0.25  0.44 
Head is divorced  0.03  0.18    0.13  0.33 
Head is unemployed  0.06  0.23    0.23  0.42 
Weeks of unemployment of head  6.76  2.01    2.39  6.34 
Head has health problem  0.07  0.26    0.04  0.19 
ln(income)        10.89  1.98 
Number of credit cards        4.44  4.36 
Risk averse        0.30  0.46 
Shop around        2.95  1.41 
Total number of observations  64,200    4,305 
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Table 2: Simple Probit model 
    PSID data  SCF data 
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Table 3: One-type model (MLE; PSID data) 
variables coefficient std  err 
Correlation between the two error terms θ  -0.1423 0.3562 
Bankruptcy equation 
Log financial benefit  0.0791***  0.0321 
Age 0.0146  0.0124 
Age squared  -0.000264**  .000138 
Lagged bankruptcy filing rate  5.805***  2.791 
Education -0.0204***  0.0098 
Family size  0.0223  0.0160 
Own business  0.0531  0.0837 
Own home  -0.05835  0.0565 
Lawyer per capita  -0.0389  0.7598 
Growth rate of income  -1.915  1.344 
State income deviation  -0.1424*  0.0774 
State and time dummies  yes   
constant -2.1573***  0.5716 
Financial benefit equation 
Excluded adverse event variables 
Health 1.924***  0.2295 
Divorce 0.3603  0.3356 
No work  -1.358***  0.2552 
Period of unemployment  0.7635***  0.1968 
Period of unemployment squared  -0.0475***  0.0123 
Other control variables 
Age -0.1338***  0.0261 
Age squared  -0.00067***  0.00027 
Lagged bankruptcy filing rate  -3.523  8.545 
Education -0.0305***  0.0147 
Family size  0.4157***  0.0398 
Own business  -3.204***  0.2238 
Own home  -3.215***  0.1332 
Lawyer per capita  -2.942*  1.618 
Growth rate of income  -2.302***  3.439 
State income deviation  -0.2989***  0.1997 
State and time dummies  yes   
Constant -0.8642**  1.6281 
Standard deviation of error term  3.2073***  0.0127 





Table 4:  One-type model (MLE; SCF data) 
variables coefficient  std 
Correlation between the two errors θ -0.2845  0.2032 
Bank equation 
Log financial benefit   0.1377***  0.0360 
Age   0.0447*  0.0240 
Age squared   -0.0004*  0.0002 
Family size   0.0551  0.0394 
Own home   0.0190  0.1285 
Own business  -0.2000  0.1981 
Years of education   0.2250  0.1643 
Years of education squared  -0.0092  0.0064 
Region dummies  Yes   
constant   -5.5722***  1.2724 
Financial benefit equation 
Excluded adverse variables 
Health   1.0410  1.1136 
No work  -4.6296***  0.8369 
Period of unemployment  0.1472  0.1248 
Period of unemployment squared  -0.0027  0.0033 
Divorce 2.6813***  0.5950 
Other control variables 
Age -0.0628  0.0845 
Age squared  -0.0014  0.0009 
Family size  0.2121  0.1516 
Own home  -5.1205***  0.4900 
Own business  -7.5376***  0.6801 
Years of education   0.5068  0.3661 
Years of education squared  -0.0483***  0.0152 
Region dummies  yes   
Constant 7.8295**  3.1007 
Standard deviation of error term  9.3535***  0.1262 







Table 5: Two-type model (MLE; SCF data) 
  coefficient sd coefficient sd 
  Strategic type Adverse event type 
Correlation b/w two errors θ -0.5846*  0.3285 0.2581 0.4163 
Bankruptcy equation 
Log(fb+1)   0.2770*** 0.0570    0.0110 0.0858 
Age   0.0222 0.0369    0.1172* 0.0653 
Age squared   -0.0002 0.0004    -0.0015** 0.0007 
Family size   -0.1045 0.0876    0.1053* 0.0588 
Own home   0.2390 0.3136    -0.2482 0.3033 
Own business  0.7114* 0.4029    -5.5096 7.4400 
Years of education  1.3436* 0.7240    -0.0134 0.1644 
Years of education
2   -0.0443* 0.0266    -0.0020 0.0071 
Region effect  Yes     Yes  
Constant   -12.3733** 5.0088   -7.2476 13.5505 
IV equation (dependent variable=log(financial benefit+1))
Excluded adverse event variables 
Health problem  -0.7917 2.3225    2.4583*  1.3444 
No work   -6.4100*** 2.3011   -3.5781***  0.9846 
Period of unemployment   3.2717** 1.5428    0.3178**  0.1384 
Period of unemployment
2  -0.5806** 0.2441   -0.0050  0.0036 
Divorce   5.1524*** 1.3938    1.8007***  0.6611 
Other control variables     
Age   0.1664 0.2156    -0.1673*  0.0973 
Age squared   -0.0023 0.0024    -0.0010  0.0010 
Family size   1.1862*** 0.3552    0.0480  0.1715 
Own home   3.7440** 1.4665    -7.0255***  0.5391 
Own business  -5.4919* 2.8768    -6.9133***  0.6964 
Years of education  -0.6585 0.7818    0.6253  0.4773 
Years of education
2  0.0206 0.0393    -0.0618***  0.0188 
Region effect  Yes     Yes   
Constant   -4.4446 7.9765    15.1605***  3.8812 
Standard deviation of error  8.4186***  0.2958   8.5855***  0.1337 
Type equation (strategic type = 1) 
ln(income)  -0.5552*** 0.1115 
Number of credit cards  -2.3736*** 0.4912 
Risk averse   0.2923 0.2453 
Shop around  -0.0519 0.0804 
Constant  5.9368*** 1.1521 




Table 6: Comparing Strategic type and Adverse Events type 
  Mean Std  Min  Max 
Probability of being 
strategic type  0.1566 0.3069  0  1 
Strategic type if predicted prob (type = 1) > 0.5 
  Strategic type    Adverse event type 
Observed probability of 
filing for bankruptcy  0.0337   0.0080 
Predicted probability of 
filing for bankruptcy  0.0984   0.0061 
Log(financial benefit)  2.4523    1.8287 
% financial benefits > 0  30.80%    20.81% 





Table 7: SCF Predictions (Two type model) 
Hypothesized 
variable change 





Percentage change in the 
filing rate 












type  Total 
Financial benefit 









65.58 0.24 27.40 
Financial benefit 
+$1000 from 









13.95 0.13  5.48 
Age of household 












38.28 121.25 78.94 
Family size +0.5 











40.06 0.02 16.44 
Own home +5% 











20.77 -3.3e-4  8.61 
Education +1 year 











152.82 95.00 113.50 
We compute each household’s estimated probability of bankruptcy under the hypothesized change, holding all other 
household characteristics at their mean. The marginal effect is the change in the probability of bankruptcy for that 
household. The column labeled “Total” gives the weighted average of the changes, using probability of strategic 
type as 0.1566 and that of adverse events type as 0.8434. The last three columns translate the marginal effects into 
the corresponding percentage change in the filing rate, as follows: divide the marginal effect of the strategic type by 
the filing probability of strategic type, which is 0.0337 in the sample, that of adverse type by their filing probability, 
which is 0.008, and the total by the total filing probability, which is 0.01278. Figures in parentheses are bootstrapped 







Table 8: SCF Predictions (Two type model): Adverse Events 
Hypothesized 
variable change 
Mean effect on log 
financial benefit 
(std) 
Percentage point  
marginal effect (std) 

















Percentage of no 
work -5 
percentage points 











27.00 0.003 10.96 
Period of 
unemployment -1 












-93.47 -0.004 -38.35 
Percentage with 
health problems -1 
percentage point 

































Table 9: Hausman Test 
 Benchmark  model 
Without “risk 




“number of cards” 
ln(income) -0.5552***  -0.5730***  --- 
Number of credit cards  -2.3736***  -2.4796***  --- 
Risk averse  0.2923  ---  2.0280*** 
Shop around  -0.0519  ---  -0.2146*** 
































Hausman test statistics  ----  3.30  9738.35 
p-value ----  1.00  0.00 
The critical value of χ
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Appendix  A 
A1. Solution to optimization problem for an adverse events consumer  
Notice that the first-order condition for the consumer's stage I problem is:  
          . 0 ) 1 ( ' 1 ) 1 ( ' 1 '           d r w u r d r w u r d u d MU b b g g
AE      Moreover, as 
 , ' lim 0    d u d  for d small enough, MU
AE(d)>0,  and for d sufficiently large, wg - (1+r)d, and wb - 
(1+r)d are sufficiently small, and hence, MU
AE(d)<0.  Therefore, there is unique d
*  d
*AE > 0 such that 
MU
AE(d
*AE)=0. Furthermore, it is easy to check that  0 / ) (    d d MU
AE , and consequently, if 
AE d d
*  , then    
AE AE AE d MU d MU




*AE) . Comparisons 
with strategic timing consumers are provided below.  
A2. Solution to optimization problem for a strategic timing consumer  
For the state g, the optimal decision of a strategic timing consumer can be characterized as follows. 
Notice that utility of filing in g, when debt is d, is    ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , file ( t t b b g w u w u e u d u d U         , 
and utility of not filing is    ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , not ( t t b b g g w u w u c u d u d U         . 
Consider the action of not filing. Then marginal utility is:     ) ( ' 1 ) ( ' , g g
ST c u r d u d not MU      . 
Notice that marginal utility is decreasing in debt, because  
   0 ) ( ' ' 1 ) ( ' ' / ,
2       g g
ST c u r d u d d not MU   . Moreover,  0 lim ( ) d ud   , implies that for 
d  small enough, MU
ST(not, d)>0,  and for d sufficiently large, wg-(1+r)d  is sufficiently small, and 
hence,   0 , not  d MU
ST . Therefore, there is a unique  0
*  d  such that    0 , not
*  d MU
ST . 
Furthermore,   0 / , not    d d MU
ST  implies that if 
* d d  , then  ) , not ( ) , no (
* d MU d t MU
ST ST  , 
and if d>d
*, then  ) , not ( ) , not (
* d MU d MU
ST ST  . Consequently, if a consumer considers not filing, 
then maximum utility possible when debt limit is d  is as follows: if 
* d d  , then maximum utility is 
    ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) , not ( t t b b g g w u w u d r w u d u d U           , and if 
* d d  , then maximum 
utility is:      ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) , not (
* * *
t t b b g g w u w u d r w u d u d U           . 
Consider the action of filing. Then marginal utility is MU
ST(file,d)=u
’(d)>0, and consequently, the 
optimal debt choice is to set  d d  . Therefore, if a consumer considers filing, the maximum utility when 
debt limit is d  is:    ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , file ( t t b b g w u w u e u d u d U         . 
In order to characterize the optimal decision, it is useful to define the level of debt at which the consumer 
is financially indifferent between filling or not. That is, let d ˆ  solve  e d r wg    ˆ ) 1 ( . In other words, 
let  ) 1 /( ) ( ˆ r e w d g    . Suppose  d d ˆ  . That is, debt limit is small relative to d ˆ . (In other words, 
d r w d r w e g g ) 1 ( ˆ ) 1 (       . That is, exemptions are small relative to net wealth after maximum 
possible debt payoff.) Then the consumer’s optimal decision is not to file in g. This can be seen by Page | 39  
 
separately considering two cases: 
* d d  , and 
* d d  . If 
* d d  , then maximum utility from not filing 
is:      ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) , not ( t t b b g g w u w u d r w u d u d U           , and maximum utility from filing 
is     ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , file ( t t b b g w u w u e u d u d U         . Moreover,  d d ˆ   implies that 
d r w d r w e g g ) 1 ( ˆ ) 1 (       , and consequently,      d U d U , file , not  .  If 
* d d  , then 
maximum utility from not filing is: 
    ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) , not (
* * *
t t b b g g w u w u d r w u d u d U           , 
and maximum utility from filing is      ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , file ( t t b b g w u w u e u d u d U         . Moreover, 
d d ˆ  , and the optimality of 
* d  imply that 
               e u d u d r w u d u d r w u d u g g g g g             1 1
* * , and consequently, 
      d U d U d U , file , not , not
*   . 
Consider now the case  d d ˆ  . That is, debt limit is large relative to d ˆ . (In other words, 
d r w d r w e g g ) 1 ( ˆ ) 1 (       . That is, exemptions are large relative to net wealth after maximum 
possible debt payoff.) Then the filing decision is a little more nuanced, and it depends on the tradeoff 
between exemptions and net wealth after paying off endogenously determined debt use. This can be seen 
by separately considering the following cases: when 
* ˆ d d  (that is, exemptions are large relative to net 
wealth after paying off optimal debt in the case of not filing) and when 
* ˆ d d   (that is, exemptions are 
small relative to net wealth after paying off optimal debt in the case of not filing). 
Suppose 
* ˆ d d  . (In other words, exemptions are large relative to wealth after paying off 
* d .) Then the 
optimal decision is to file, and it can be seen by considering the following two cases. If 
* d d  , then 
maximum utility from not filing is: 
    ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) , not ( t t b b g g w u w u d r w u d u d U           , and maximum utility from filing is 
  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , file ( t t b b g w u w u e u d u d U         . Moreover,  d d ˆ   implies that 
d r w d r w e g g ) 1 ( ˆ ) 1 (       , and consequently,      d U d U , not , file  . If 
* d d  , then 
maximum utility from not filing is      ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) , not (
* * *
t t b b g g w u w u d r w u d u d U           , 
and maximum utility from filing is    ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , file ( t t b b g w u w u e u d u d U         . Moreover, 
* ˆ d d   implies that  d r w d r w e g g ) 1 ( ˆ ) 1 (       , and consequently,      d U d U , not , file  . Page | 40  
 
Suppose 
* ˆ d d  . (Exemptions are small relative to d
*.) Then there is a unique 
* d , 
* ˆ d d  , such that if 
* ˆ d d d   , then optimal decision is to not file, and if  d d 
* , then optimal decision is to file. This 
case highlights an interesting dynamic. In this case, relatively high debt limits additionally affect a 
consumer’s decision to file. That is, even when exemptions are relatively small as compared to a 
consumer’s desired debt (when not filing), she may decide to file, if her debt limit is sufficiently high to 
make the intertemporal consumption tradeoff valuable. This sufficiently high threshold is characterized 
by 
* d . Recall from a previous case that if  d d  ˆ  and 
* ˆ d d  , then  ) , file ( ) , not (
* d U d U  . In other 
words, if exemptions are the same as net wealth after maximum debt payoff, but consumer’s optimal use 
of debt is smaller than maximum debt allowed, then it is beneficial for the consumer to not file, 
essentially because the additional consumption in period 1 from additional debt does not compensate for 
the decrease in consumption in state g that results from filing. Therefore, for d  slightly larger than d ˆ , 
) , file ( ) , not (
* d U d U  . However, in the region    ,
* d ,  0 / ) , not (
*    d d U , and, 
  0 ' / ) , file (     d u d d U . In other words, maximum utility from filing is strictly increasing in d , 
while maximum utility from not filing is constant. Moreover, u  is unbounded above. Consequently, there 
is a unique 
* d , 
* ˆ d d  , such that for each d , if 
* ˆ d d d   , then optimal choice is to not file, and if 
d d 
* , then optimal choice is to file.  
Appendix B 
This appendix presents the joint density of log of (bank, ln(fb+1)) if both adverse event type and the 
strategic type people are potentially present but unobserved. 
The join density (file, ln(fb+1)) is given by: 
 
 
    
     W AE X T W AE X T fb file f
W AE X T W AE X T fb file f
W AE X fb file f
, , | 2 Pr , , , 2 | 1 ln ,
, , | 1 Pr , , , 1 | 1 ln ,
, , | 1 ln ,
  
   
 
 
We assume that the set of W is such that        W W T W AE X T      | 1 Pr , , | 1 Pr , and  
         AE X T fb file f W AE X T fb file f , , 1 | 1 ln , , , , 1 | 1 ln ,      . In other words, the set of W 
only affects of probability of being in one of the two types. It does not affect conditional joint density of 
(file, ln(fb+1)|T).  
The join density of (file, ln(fb+1)) consists four observed cases, (file=1, ln(fb+1)=0), (file=0, 
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